In the 1990s, North Korea experienced one of the worst famines of the 20th century. By our estimates, as many as 1 million people — or five percent of the population — perished, the equivalent to 15 million deaths if such an event were to occur in the United States. Although the worst of the famine has passed, food shortages and malnutrition remain a chronic problem, with some households spending up to 80 percent of their income on food.

As many as 300,000 refugees have fled to China, living in fear and uncertainty, vulnerable to deportation and punishment in North Korea at any moment.

The world community has responded to this tragedy with considerable generosity, committing more than $2 billion in food aid over the past decade. The United States alone contributed more than $600 million, equivalent to 2 million metric tons of grain, and South Korea has become a major donor. The Korean American community in the United States has also assisted, particularly through churches involved in assisting refugees and providing aid through China.

Aid efforts reflect strong humanitarian impulses. But 10 years after the famine, we have to assess the impact of these efforts. Is aid benefiting the North Korean population, or is it merely shoring up the Kim Jong Il regime? Should aid be curtailed in order to achieve political objectives, such as denuclearization or even regime change? What forms of assistance are likely to be most beneficial over the long run?

 

Roadblocks to Aid

The primary conduit for the famine relief effort has been the United Nations’ World Food Program (WFP). It solicits food aid from member countries and oversees its distribution to areas of the world experiencing distress. At the peak of its program in North Korea, the WFP was distributing enough food to feed more than one-third of the population — roughly 8 million vulnerable individuals — in a country the size of Louisiana.

Yet at virtually every turn, the North Korean government places roadblocks in the way of the donor community, for example, prohibiting Korean speakers or ethnic Koreans from participating in the WFP’s operations. Today, fewer than 10 WFP staff are in North Korea, and they are confined to the capital city Pyongyang. They are only permitted supervised trips outside the capital once every three months. Under such constraints, it is impossible to monitor aid deliveries effectively, and our estimates suggest that up to half of aid deliveries do not reach their intended recipients.

Obviously, it would be best if the aid reached its targeted beneficiaries. Yet in the North Korean case, the diversion of aid has had an oddly positive side-effect, encouraging the development of markets. During a famine, food aid is extremely valuable, and there is an enormous incentive to sell  the goods in the market — if such markets exist. In North Korea, however, markets were thoroughly suppressed under the communist system. Ironically, the in-flow of aid encouraged the development of markets, a desirable development in the long run.